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Jean-Jacques Laffont, economist extraordinaire and visionary founder of the 
Institut de l’Economie Industrielle ( IDEI ) in Toulouse, died at his home in Colomiers on 
May 1 after a valiant battle against cancer.  He was fifty-seven years old. 
 
Laffont is remarkable for having had three distinct professional identities and for 
performing at the very highest level in all of them. 
 
First, he was one of the great economists of our time.  He was instrumental in 
transforming public economics, regulatory economics, and the economics of 
organizations into fields of study that put primary emphasis on conflicts in incentives.  In 
a dozen books and many scores of articles, he examined these conflicts, which arise when 
the objectives of a society, industry, or organization differ from those of the agents—e.g., 
people or firms—who belong to them. 
 
Second, as an institution builder, Laffont assembled a formidable array of 
economic talent at IDEI, now one of the finest educational and research groups in the 
world.  Somehow Laffont overcame the gravitational attraction of Paris and brought this 
talent to Toulouse, then a relative backwater.  On a continent where universities are 
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supported by the state, he put an alternative model on display: IDEI’s funders come 
largely from the corporate world.  They support the basic research vital to the intellectual 
life of the place in exchange for expert advice from IDEI’s economists.  Laffont not only 
invented this imaginative approach to funding research, but personally attracted most of 
the partner firms who support IDEI today. 
 
Third, he proved to be a forceful and influential policy advisor on regulation, 
competition, and economic development.  More than most other theorists, he was a 
natural in this role.  Even his purest theoretical papers were invariably motivated by 
issues of genuine practical consequence, and his scientific work provided a remarkably 
coherent and detailed conception of the role of public intervention.  
 
Jean-Jacques Laffont was born in Toulouse on April 13, 1947.  Educated in  
mathematics and economics at the University of Toulouse and ENSAE in Paris, he 
completed his doctorate under Kenneth Arrow at Harvard in 1975.  He then taught first at 
the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris and, after passing the “Aggrégation,”
1 briefly at the 
University of Amiens.  But he lost little time before returning to Toulouse in 1978.  At 
the University he created GREMAQ (Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathematique 
et Quantitative) in 1981 and IDEI in 1990; he directed the Institut until illness forced him 
to step down in 2002.  Toulouse remained his home to the end, although he traveled 
frequently and held visiting positions at many places including Caltech and Harvard.  
Beginning in 2001, he spent part of his time at the University of Southern California, 
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where he was named Distinguished Professor earlier this year.  He is survived by Colette, 
his wife of thirty-three years; his three daughters Cécile, Bénédicte, and Charlotte; and 
his son, Bertrand. 
 
  Laffont was showered with many honors and awards in recognition of his work.  
To mention only a few: he received the first Yrjö-Jahnsson Prize (jointly with Jean 
Tirole) from the European Economic Association; he served as president of both the 
European Economic Association and the Econometric Society; he was elected an 
honorary fellow of both the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American 
Economic Association, and in 2002 he was named Officier de la Légion ď Honneur. 
 
1. Public Decision-Making 
  Laffont first came to international prominence for his work with Jerry Green on 
incentives in public decision-making.  Imagine that society must choose from a set of 
possible public alternatives A.  If society consists of n individuals, 1, …, n, then, in 
principle, a social planner would like to choose the alternative a
∗ that is optimal in the 
sense that 
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where  () i va  is individual i’s utility for alternative a (individual i’s overall utility is 
() ii va t + , where  i t  is a monetary transfer).  Suppose, however, that the planner does not 
know individuals’ utility functions.  He could ask individuals to report them, but they   4 
might well not have the incentive to do so truthfully. 
 
  Groves (1973) and Clarke (1971) proposed transfer mechanisms for solving this 
incentive problem. Specifically, Clarke showed that if, when individuals report utility 
functions () 1 ˆˆ ,, n vv … , alternative  ˆ a is selected to solve 
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and each individual i is given monetary transfer 
 
(3)     () ( ) ( ) 1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,, m a x in j j aA
ji ji
tv v va va
∈
≠≠
=− ∑ ∑ … , 
then it is a dominant strategy for individual i to report  ˆii vv =  (i.e., regardless of what the 
others do, individual i is best off reporting truthfully), and so, from (1) and (2), the 
optimal alternative a
∗ is the equilibrium outcome.
2 
 
           This mechanism, although very influential, is only one example from a large class 
of “satisfactory” mechanisms, ones in which (i) truth-telling is a dominant strategy, and 
(ii) the optimal alternative a
∗ is implemented.  It was clearly an important outstanding 
problem to characterize the class of all satisfactory mechanisms.  Green and Laffont 
(1977) provided the solution; they showed that the satisfactory class consists of 
mechanisms in which individual i’s transfer takes the form 
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tv v va k v −
≠
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where  i v−  is the vector of all utility functions but individual i’s.
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  In a sequence of articles (Green and Laffont 1978, 1979 a and b) and an 
influential monograph (Green and Laffont 1979c), Green and Laffont derived many 
implications from this characterization.  For example, they showed that   there exists no 
satisfactory scheme in which (i) the transfers balance, i.e., in which they sum to zero; or 
(ii) truth-telling constitutes a dominant strategy for coalitions.  In part III of Green and 
Laffont (1979c), they examined the possibility of satisfying such properties as (i) and (ii) 
in a statistical sense.  For example, they demonstrated that, for large n, one can find 
satisfactory mechanisms that, with arbitrarily high probability, make per-capita 
imbalance and the probability of untruthfulness by a coalition of a given size as small as 
one likes. 
  Green and Laffont imposed no differentiability assumptions on utility functions.   
Laffont and Maskin (1980) showed that if individual i’s possible preferences can be 






∈Θ ⋅ , where  ( ) , ii va θ  is differentiable in   and  , a θ  then 
the conclusion that, for satisfactory mechanisms, transfers must take the form (4) follows 
directly from integrating the first-order condition for truth-telling by individual i;
4 the 
function  () i kv −  falls out as a constant of integration.  Many other results, such as the 
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conclusions above about balanced transfers and coalitions, follow equally easily with this 
approach. 
 
  Green and Laffont’s demonstration that satisfactory mechanisms do not have 
balanced transfers led ďAspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) to weaken the dominant-
strategy requirement and demand only that truth-telling constitute a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium.  For that equilibrium concept, they showed that balanced transfers are 
possible when the  s i θ  are distributed independently.  Assuming differentiability as in 
Laffont and Maskin (1980), Laffont and Maskin (1979a) characterized the entire class of 
such mechanisms (i.e., those in which truth-telling is a Bayesian equilibrium, the 
outcome is optimal alternative a
∗, and transfers balance).  They demonstrated, moreover, 
that if there exists a positive measure of parameter values ( ) 1,, n θ θ …  such that 
() ,0 ii vaθ
∗ < , for some  , i then no mechanism from that class satisfies individual 
rationality in the sense that 
() , 0  for all   and 
i vi ii i Ev a t i θ θ
−




− ” denotes the expectation with respect to the other individuals’ utility 
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  Inspired by a renewed concern in Europe and the U.S. over how natural 
monopolies and oligopolies should be regulated, Laffont’s main work on incentive issues 
next shifted to models of regulation,
7 largely in collaboration with Jean Tirole.  Much of 
their joint work was consolidated in the treatise Laffont and Tirole (1993).  The following 
are some of their findings. 
 
  A typical Laffont-Tirole regulatory model consists of a regulator and a single firm 
whose cost of production (suppose that only one level of production is possible) is 
    Ce θ ε = −+   , 
where e is the firm’s effort to reduce cost;  [ ] , θ θθ ∈  is a parameter known only to the 
firm and drawn from cumulative distribution function  ( ) F θ ; and ε   is a random variable 
with mean zero.  If the regulator reimburses the firm for its production cost, then the 
firm’s utility U is  
     ( ) Utc e =− , 
where  () ce, a convex and increasing function, is the cost of effort, and t is a monetary 
transfer beyond the reimbursement of cost C.  The regulator, representing the overall 
welfare of society (including that of the firm), has utility 
    () ( ) 1, St C U λ −+ + +  
where S is the social benefit of the firm’s production, and λ  is the marginal deadweight 
loss from the taxes needed to finance the gross transfer tC + . 
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  If, for now, we omit ε  , the regulator’s problem amounts to finding an incentive 
scheme  () () () , tC θ θ  that solves  
(5)     ( ) () () () () () max 1 St C U d F
θ
θ λ θθ θθ ⎡⎤ −+ + + ⎣⎦ ∫  
 subject  to 
(6)   () () () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆˆ for all  , Utc C tc C θ θθθ θθθ θ θ =− − ≥− −  
 and 
(7)   ()0 U θ ≥ , 
where (6) comprises the firm’s incentive constraints, and (7) constitutes its individual 
rationality constraint. 
 
  Following Mirrlees (1971), one can show that the optimal scheme  () ( ) () , tC θ θ
∗∗  
has the properties that (i) if it has the highest cost ( ) i.e., θ θ = , the firm enjoys no surplus 
(i.e., (7) is binding), but surplus is positive for every  ( ) ( ) i.e., 0 U θθ θ < > ; and (ii) 
effort is efficient for the lowest cost, i.e.,  ( ) ( ) 1 cC θθ
∗ ′ − = , but below the efficient level 
for all θ θ > , i.e.,  () () 1 cC θθ
∗ ′ −< . 
 
  Laffont and Tirole (1986) showed that one can choose scalars  () ˆ a θ  and  () ˆ b θ , 
for all  ˆ θ , such that  () () ()
* , tC θ θ
∗  can be decentralized as a menu of linear contracts   9 
(8)     () ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ta b CC θ θθ
∗ =− − , 
where C is the actual production cost.  In other words, the regulator can implement the 
optimal scheme by letting the firm select the contract it prefers from among the menu (8); 
for suitably chosen scalars, the firm will, in fact, choose the one for which  ˆ θ θ = .  
Indeed, because (8) is linear in C and the firm is assumed to be risk-neutral,
8 this menu 
will implement the optimum even when we reintroduce the noise term ε  . 
 
  Next, suppose that there are several alternative firms that could produce the same 
good but that it is too costly to have more than one do so.  Then, it is desirable to have a 
competition among the firms for the right to become a regulated monopolist.  Laffont and 
Tirole (1987) established that, if the different firms’ cost parameters θ  are drawn 
independently from the distribution  ( ) F θ , then under standard regularity conditions the 
optimal competition (from the standpoint of maximizing the regulator’s payoff) takes the 
form of an auction in which each firm makes a monetary bid to become the monopolist, 
and the winner is the high bidder and pays the second-highest bid.  Furthermore, the 
winner should be confronted with the same menu of contracts as in the preceding 
paragraph.  Thus, the effect of competition is only to reduce (but not eliminate) the net 
transfer that is made to the monopolist; in particular, the winning firm’s effort is the same 
as though it had no competitors. 
 
  Now let us suppose that the one-period model is extended to two periods, and that 
the firm produces in both (maintaining the same cost parameter θ  throughout).  Assume 
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that the firm and regulator share the same discount rate.  If ex ante the regulator could 
offer the firm a menu of two-period contracts, then, as Baron and Besanko (1984) 
showed, the optimum would simply repeat the optimal one-period contract.  Matters are 
different, however, when the regulator cannot commit in advance to a second-period 
agreement.  In that case, Laffont and Tirole (1988) proved that there must be a 
nondegenerate interval of cost parameters such that, for all θ  in the interval, the firm 
chooses the same first-period contract, i.e., there is pooling.  The idea is that a firm will 
be reluctant to reveal its true θ  because if it did so, the regulator would be able to extract 
all its surplus in the second period. 
 
  Finally, imagine that the regulator can hire an inspector who, with some 
probability, can verifiably determine the firm’s true θ .  Such a determination, if turned 
over to the regulator, would enable him to extract all surplus from a firm with cost 
parameter θ θ < .  Thus, the firm has an incentive to bribe the inspector to keep quiet.  
Laffont and Tirole (1991) demonstrated that to minimize the welfare loss from such 
bribery it is optimal to lower the power of the incentive scheme.  That is, the regulator 
should choose a smaller gradient  ( ) U θ ′  than in the case where bribery is ruled out. 
3. Collusion in Organizations 
  Laffont’s last extended exploration of incentive issues focused on collusion in 
organizations.  This reflected his conviction, based in part on his direct observation, that 
manipulation of information by coalitions of agents (e.g., the firm bribing the inspector to 
keep him quiet in the model of the preceding paragraph) is a major constraint on the   11 
performance of bureaucracies such as corporations and governments.  He conducted 
much of his work in this area in collaboration with David Martimort. 
 
  Laffont and Martimort (1997) set out a useful methodology for studying collusion 
in a principal-multiagent setting.  They supposed that first a third party (the collusion 
coordinator) proposes a contract under which the agents 1,…, n, agree to share all 
transfers from the principal equally .  Then, the agents privately learn their preference 
parameters  1,, n θ θ … .  Next, the principal specifies a mechanism that assigns a transfer to 
each agent as a function of the public announcements  1 ˆˆ ,, n θ θ …  that agents make later.  
After that, the collusion coordinator offers the agents a side contract in which their public 
announcements are prescribed by what they tell the coordinator their parameters are.  The 
contract also specifies transfers that give them the incentive to tell the coordinator the 
truth (this makes explicit the idea that collusion is subject to the same sort of incentive 
constraints as any other kind of agreement).  In the final stage, the coordinator’s side 
contract is executed, and the actions and transfers specified by the principal’s mechanism 
are carried out. 
 
  One notable application of this framework was developed in Laffont and 
Martimort (2000).  Researchers had been troubled by the stark difference between 
principal-multiagent problems in which agents’ information parameters are drawn 
independently and those where they are correlated.  Recall the regulatory model with 
competition from section 2, where it was noted that competition reduces but does not 
eliminate the winning firm’s surplus and does not affect the “distortion” of the winner’s   12 
effort (recall that e is below the efficient level for all θ θ > ).  This conclusion depends 
crucially on the different firms’ cost parameters being independent; matters change 
dramatically as soon as the  s θ  are correlated.  Using the methods of Crémer and McLean 
(1988), the regulator in the latter case can devise an incentive scheme that (i) extracts all 
surplus from the winning firm, and (ii) induces the efficient level of effort. 
 
  Laffont and Martimort (2000) observed, however, that Crémer-McLean 
mechanisms are not immune to collusion by agents. More significantly, they showed that 
once one takes the constraints induced by the possibility of collusion into account, the 
above discontinuity vanishes. That is, the nature of the optimal incentive scheme changes 
continuously as one passes from the case of correlation to that of independence. 
4. More Incentives 
  The previous three sections sketch Laffont’s work on incentives in the three areas 
that preoccupied him most.  But he strongly believed that incentives are at the heart of 
many other fields of economics, and undertook significant research into some of these 
fields himself. For example, Laffont (1999), (2000), Jeon and Laffont (1999), and Laffont 
and Martimort (1999) explored incentive issues that arise in political economy; Laffont 
and Tirole (1996) and Boyer and Laffont (1999) did the same for environmental issues, 
while Laffont and N’ Guessan (1999) and Laffont and Meleu (1999) did so for 
development.
9  Indeed, toward the end of his life, Laffont increasingly focused on the 
problems of emerging economies, both as researcher and policy consultant.  His last 
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completed book, Laffont (2004), analyzed how regulation of public services can crucially 
assist the development process. 
 
  Laffont and Martimort had planned to exposit the modern theory of incentives in 
a three-volume treatise.  Sadly, only the first volume, Laffont and Martimort (2002), was 




  Laffont was highly unusual among world-class theorists in that he was also a first-
rate econometrician.  Indeed, his very first published article in English, joint with Dale 
Jorgenson, proposed a method for estimating nonlinear equations (Jorgenson and Laffont, 
1974). 
 
  He was a leading figure in the literature on the econometrics of “disequilibrium” 
models, where prices fail to adjust to clear markets so that quantity-rationing becomes 
necessary.  Articles in this line include Gourieroux, Laffont and Monfort (1980) and 
Bouissou, Laffont, and Vuong (1986).  Later, he made major contributions to the 
econometric analysis of auctions, e.g., Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995). 
 
6. Other Work 
  Although Laffont will be remembered especially for his work on incentives, he in 
fact ranged widely within theory.  The following are just a few examples of his breadth:   14 
Helpman and Laffont (1975) was an exploration of moral hazard and adverse selection 
issues in general equilibrium settings.  Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) developed a theory 
of the firm based on the risk attitudes of entrepreneurs.  Laffont and Laroque (1976) 
provided conditions for the existence of general equilibrium when firms are imperfectly 
competitive.  Laffont and Moreaux (1983) studied the properties of economies in which 
workers own the means of production.  Laffont (1985) (Laffont’s Walras-Bowley lecture) 
studied the welfare properties of equilibrium in competitive models when prices serve not 
only to clear markets but also to aggregate information.  Green and Laffont (1994) 
explored the theoretical implications of contract renegotiation.  Laffont and Maskin 
(1990) examined the positive and normative consequences of allowing insiders to trade 
on the stock market.  Guesnerie and Laffont (1988) investigated the possibility of 
competitive equilibria that depend on “sunspots,” signals that have no effect at all on the 
fundamentals of the economy.  Laffont and Robert (1996) showed how to design a 
revenue-maximizing auction when buyers are budget-constrained.  Finally, Laffont, Rey, 
and Tirole (1998a and b) analyzed the nature of competition between interconnected 
networks.
10 
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7. Concluding Remark 
  Creating an institution like IDEI calls for intellectual leadership and vision, and 
Jean-Jacques Laffont was in short supply of neither.  But these virtues are not enough; the 
would-be creator’s personal qualities play an indispensable role too.  Nobody would deny 
that Jean-Jacques was intense - - someone so prodigiously productive could scarcely have 
been otherwise. But he had a lightness of touch, a warmth, and above all an enthusiasm 
that people—colleagues, clients, and administrators alike—were drawn to irresistibly. 
  To the economics profession, Jean-Jacques has bequeathed his scientific work, his 
beloved IDEI, and the memory of his irrepressible personality.  Losing him so 
prematurely is a tragedy.  These things, however, will endure.
11 
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